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Language can play an essential role in shaping how accounting reforms and the information around 
them are communicated and legitimated. However, scant consideration has been given to study what 
happens when politicians are the decision makers of accounting changes. This paper explores the 
political use of language by investigating how the Members of Parliament discuss about public-sector 
accounting reforms, and deploy different rhetorical strategies to legitimate or de-legitimate them. 
Through the analysis of Italian parliamentary debates in the 1990s and 2000s, this study highlights 
how the use of language can facilitate the exercise of power by deploying arguments rhetorically 
dominated by authorisation and moralisation strategies. The rhetorical arguments brought forward 
allow politicians to disguise their loss of power in favour of the European Union, depicting their actions 
and proposals as necessary and/or in favour of the public interest.  
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1. Introduction 
Language can play an essential role in shaping how change and reforms are communicated and 
legitimated. Language represents a means of symbolic power that grants the speaker unlimited 
possibilities to gain the audience’s support (Bourdieu, 1991). This is not less true in a context, the 
public sector, where major changes and reforms have been introduced over the past few decades, 
touching, among others, accounting systems. In the case of public-sector accounting reforms, in 
particular, the Members of Parliament (MPs)are bestowed by the citizens with the power and 
responsibility to decide about the introduction of new changes. There have been several calls to look 
more into how accounting is implicated in politics and how, in turn, politicians and politics are 
implicated in accounting (Ezzamel, Robson, Stapleton & McLean, 2007; Van Helden, 2015). A number 
of studies have  explored politicians’ use of accounting data, understanding of accounting reforms and 
their role during their implementation (Ter Bogt, 2004; Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, Lapsley, & Pallot, 
2005; Flury & Schedler, 2006; Liguori, Sicilia & Steccolini, 2009 and 2012; Saliterer & Korac, 2013; 
Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen & Lapsley, 2014). Some have specifically looked at political accountability 
itself (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013; Ezzamel et al, 2005). While in such studies politicians have been 
seen as users of accounting, less consideration has been given so far to what happens when politicians 
discuss and approve accounting reforms. Although the above studies have suggested that the actual 
understanding and use of accounting information by politicians is limited, MPs are required to discuss 
and approve public-sector accounting reforms and enter the reform arena to support (or undermine) 
possible changes to the accounting systems.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the political use of language and, specifically, investigate how MPs 
discuss public-sector accounting reforms, and deploy different rhetorical strategies to legitimate or 
de-legitimate them in front of the Parliament and their peers. The case under analysis refers to Italian 
central government accounting reforms and the related parliamentary discussions in the 1990s and 
2000s. The study, by looking at political discourses, investigates different ways of legitimating 
accounting reforms over time. The period covered goes from when Europe was first invested by the 
managerial wave of reforms (also known as New Public Management -NPM) in the 1990s, to the 
adoption of the euro, and from this to the hard consequences of the global financial crisis. Italy 
represents a particularly interesting context, on the one hand because of it being considered a mild 
adopter of NPM reforms (or a neo-weberian country, Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011); on the other hand, 
because it is the largest country (by population, GDP and public debt) in the Eurozone which faced 
particularly difficult conditions as a consequence of the global financial crisis. 
This study contributes to the limited literature on the theme by investigating the language and 
legitimation strategies used by politicians when debating public-sector reforms. In doing so, it 
discusses the symbolic power of language exercised through the use of particular legitimation 
strategies by actors, the MPs, who generally have limited knowledge of the technical (accounting) 
matters being debated. It also addresses recent calls for exploring how accounting is implicated in 
discussions about crises and austerity (Bracci, Humphrey, Moll & Steccolini, 2015; Lapsley & Hodges, 
2016). Finally, the study contributes, more generally, to gain a better understanding of the processes 
through which politicians discuss and approve accounting reforms, especially with reference to civil 
law countries1. The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the relevant literature on 
the topic; section three presents the methodology, and the fourth discusses the main results of the 
empirical analysis. The fifth section concludes by highlighting some implications and suggesting 
possible further research avenues.  
 
2. Language and legitimation strategies: political tools?  
The role of language in organisations, institutions, society and policy continues to attract significant 
scholarly attention, ever since Saussure’s (1960) and Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) seminal 
contributions, respectively on linguistics and sociology of knowledge. Indeed, already half a century 
ago, Berger and Luckmann (1966) pointed to the power of language and its role in the construction of 
reality by suggesting that (p. 55) “[l]anguage constructs immense edifices of symbolic representations 
that appear to tower over the reality of everyday life like gigantic presences from another world”. A 
decade after, Meyer and Rowan (1977) underlined the relevance of language as a source of 
legitimation. More generally, language has been often recognised to represent an instrument of 
control (Hodge & Kress, 1993; Reyes, 2011) and a manifestation of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1991) 
in both policy and society. Social and political legitimation are often sought by powerful groups and 
institutions, such as the State or Government, to gain normative approval for their policies and actions 
(Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). Politicians, in particular, can use forms of symbolic power by bending language 
and debates to gain control over the audience and final legitimation for their actions, to justify their 
policies and to attract support around their political goals (Chouliaraki, 2005; Cap, 2008). According to 
Bourdieu (1991), the meaning generated and shared through language is the result of the interaction 
between the speaker and the other linguistic products and devices that are simultaneously available 
to the audience in the same social space.  
A significant body of research has focused on actors’ search of legitimation and the central role 
language plays in such processes (Green, 2004). The symbolic effects of language, indeed, can be 
                                                            
1 We are indebted to one of the referees for pointing out this additional contribution of the paper.  
better understood by studying the formal mechanism attached to it (Bourdieu, 1991). Legitimation is 
enacted by providing arguments that explain our social actions, ideas and thoughts, seeking the 
interlocutor’s approval (Baker, 2015) relying on publicly shared and justifiable systems of beliefs, 
values, and norms (Fairclough, 2012).  
Previous literature shows that the political search for legitimation (as a resource through which 
exercise political power) is generally accomplished through persuasive or manipulative dialogue 
(Baker, 2015; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). Politicians can do this by appealing to experiences, emotions and 
meanings that are purposefully constructed and shaped (Bakhtin, 1981). With reference to 
accounting, Christensen and Skaerbaek (2007, 2015) showed that legitimation around accounting 
reforms can be increased through processes of “purification”, where language and expert (or 
consultancy) bodies mobilise positive arguments around the change and minimising resistance to it.  
The use of linguistic legitimation strategies and devices by politicians is essential in the construction 
of consensus and in the political search for justification to government and parliamentary actions. 
Legitimation strategies, for instance, can describe actions in neutral or positive terms, emphasising 
their acceptability or de-emphasising their unacceptability (Rojo & van Dijk 1997), providing 
justification to why we should do something in a particular way (van Leeuwen, 2007). Building on 
institutional theory and critical discourse analysis, the literature on legitimation strategies has 
identified five possible discursive strategies, where language is used to gain legitimation (van Leeuwen 
& Wodak, 1999): authorisation, moralisation, narrativisation, normalisation and rationalisation. As 
Joutsenvita and Vaara (2015: 744) highlighted, these strategies are “specific, but not always 
intentional or conscious ways of using discursive resources to establish legitimacy or de-legitimacy”.  
Authorisation refers to (de)legitimation through authority of tradition, law and figures upon which 
authority of some kind has been bestowed. Moralisation strategies refer to (de)legitimation by 
reference to specific value (and ethical) systems. Narrativisation is about (de)legitimation conveyed 
through narratives: telling a story, indeed, can provide evidence of appropriate or preferential 
behaviour. Rationalisation is related to (de)legitimation by reference to the utility of the proposed 
change, with such a strategy mainly focusing on the benefits or outcomes that a course of action can 
bring. Finally, normalisation (de)legitimates by exemplarity, making the case at hand something 
professional, appropriate or ”normal” given a certain context. As shown by Lefsrud and Meyer (2012), 
authorisation, rationalisation and normalisation strategies align with Green’s (2004) notion of logos 
(legitimation of change through the adoption of rational arguments from different sources), while 
moralisation strategies align with what Green (2004) called ethos (legitimation through credibility, 
moral authority or tradition). In addition to the above strategies, Green (2004) and Bitektine and 
Haack (2015) also identified a route of (de)legitimation via pathos (i.e. by appeals to emotions 
different from the other strategies.  
Legitimation strategies are embedded within specific social contexts, and what counts as a legitimate 
argument may differ across different settings (Joutsenvirta & Vaara 2015; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). 
Discursive legitimation and rhetorical argumentation strategies have been found relevant in different 
contexts, such as during institutional change (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), and to explain actors’ 
struggles over controversial issues, including organizational shutdowns (Erkama & Vaara, 2010), 
climate change (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012), shareholder value (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010), corporate 
restructuring (Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006) and international corporate investments (Joutsenvirta & 
Vaara, 2015). In relation to accounting, Covaleski, Dirsmith and Rittenberg (2003) explored the 
legitimation strategies used by the (then) ‘Big Five’ accounting firms in order to re-institutionalise 
societal expectations of proper professional behaviour. They found that accountants tend to use 
rhetorical arguments mainly based on moral and normative aspects. Adopting a classification similar 
to the one proposed in this study, Hyndman and Liguori (2016), investigating managers’ views of UK 
central-government accounting reforms, suggested that a mix of legitimation strategies was used to 
construct a sense of change, with authorisation, often in combination with rationalisation strategies, 
prevailing.  
The above studies showed that the six legitimation strategies here considered (namely, authorisation, 
moralisation, narrativisation, normalisation, pathos and rationalisation) can provide a parsimonious 
way to classify the ways language is used to support (or hinder) decisions, actions and changes. Such 
studies, however, also highlighted that legitimation strategies are often intertwined. For instance, 
Vaara et al. (2006) found authorisation to be associated frequently with rationalisation and 
moralisation, because authorities themselves can represent specific institutions and viewpoints. 
Authorisation and rationalisation strategies have been identified as the most frequent combination of 
arguments in support of public-sector accounting reforms (Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). Green et al. 
(2008) also indicated that pathos strategies may play a major part at the beginning of a process of 
change, before the new practice becomes accepted and more rational arguments are used. However, 
previous studies (especially in accounting) have paid little attention to the political arena (for an 
exception, see Brown, Ainsworth & Grant, 2012), leaving a gap in our understanding of how such 
political decisions are taken and advanced.  
 
3. Methodology 
This paper explores the use of language and legitimation strategies made by MPs as they discuss and 
approve public-sector accounting reforms. Italian central-government financial accounting, budgeting 
and performance management reforms are taken into consideration, spanning from the 1990s to the 
2000s; i.e. from NPM reforms up to the aftermath of the financial crisis, with the year 2000 and the 
adoption of euro used as a conventional divider between the two periods. This provides a sufficient 
time span to identify different patterns. Italy has a strong legalistic administrative tradition and has 
been often identified as a typical Napoleonic country and a medium-intensity adopter of NPM ideas 
(Hood 1995; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011; Liguori, Steccolini & Rota, 2016; Arnaboldi et al, 2016). Being a 
civil-law country, Italy has always relied on laws and administrative acts to adopt reforms (Panozzo, 
1998). Moreover, it was among the countries significantly affected by the sovereign-debt crisis which 
followed the 2008 global financial crisis.  
In this study, discourse analysis is used to investigate how politicians talked about and justified the 
introduction of accounting reforms. Several calls have been advanced to consider more closely the 
relationship between codified discourses and practice to improve our understanding of the 
discourse/practice dynamics within organisations (Llewellyn & Milne, 2007; Liguori et al, 2016). This 
study follows in these footsteps. Different from previous literature, however, it does not investigate 
the managers’ perspective, but explores politicians’ views through the analysis of their parliamentary 
discussions over time. Political talk has been often defined as a language of legitimation, made of 
arguments and deliberations (Abulof, 2015). Studying this language can help us understand both the 
frames politicians use to legitimate their policies, and what they believe to be the arguments more 
likely to convince the audience about the acceptability a certain course of action.  
The documents considered in this paper are representative of the entire legislative process 
(Borghetto, 2014), concerning changes in financial accounting, budgeting and performance 
management systems. A total of 17 debate transcripts (378 pages and 1261 hits in total)- 8 in the 
1990s and 9 in the 2000s- were analysed, these including all the discussions that took place in both 
Chambers of Parliament and related technical committees as regards bills, legislative-decrees and 
laws2. These documents were collected from the institutional archives of the two parliamentary 
Chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It is important to stress that the transcripts under 
analysis relate to the discussions that took place in Parliament and political committees. Although 
these transcripts are available to the general public (mainly through the internet), previous evidence 
has shown that public interest in official (accounting) disclosure is often sporadic in both public and 
not-for-profit settings (Eden & Hyndman, 2001; Connolly, Hyndman & McConville, 2014). MPs’ 
discussions and their contents may be, thus, considered as mainly addressed to their political peers. 
Rather than representing a means for political propaganda towards the general public, the arguments 
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243/2012). Such represent the main accounting-related laws, passed over the considered period, which also brought about 
a substantial change in the accounting, budgeting and performance management systems of the Italian central government. 
While the number of documents and coded hits differ across the two considered decades, being the study fundamentally 
qualitative and explorative in nature, it specifically focuses on the relative importance, ranking and use of legitimation 
strategies. It does not seek or claim any statistical relationship or significance among the strategies themselves. 
mobilised aimed at convincing their counterparts of the opportunity of their proposals as far as 
accounting reforms were concerned3.  
As required by the Italian legislative process when passing a law, the transcripts covered testimonies 
from all the political groups present in the different periods. It is interesting to note that the 
background of Italian politicians is still tied to the traditional legalistic and bureaucratic administrative 
tradition. A large number of the MPs who were discussing accounting matters were lawyers or had a 
law background (see Table 1, which details the background and distribution of the politicians who took 
the floor, in absolute and percentage terms). In the 1990s, in particular, lawyers represented the vast 
majority of the MPs discussing reforms (32% of the total, Table 1). In the 2000s, these still represented 
one of the biggest groups (25% of the total speakers), although, in this second decade, the number of 
MPs who took the floor and had a degree in accounting, economics or business administration grew 
to similar levels (Table 1). This may be due to the consolidation of “Berlusconism” (Mariotti, 2011; 
Orsina, 2014; Woods, 2014), which brought ideas such as “de-politicisation” and entrepreneurialism 
into Italian politics. Despite this phenomenon, however, the number of MPs with some kind of 
accounting background remained overall a relative minority in both periods. A residual, but important, 
number of MPs discussing accounting reforms also held degrees in sociology and political sciences, 
medicine and engineering (these latter two included into “Others” in Table 1).   
 
Insert Table 1 
 
The categories coded in this study concerned legitimation and delegitimation strategies. In 
distinguishing the strategies, the typologies proposed by Vaara at al. (2006) and van Leeuwen and 
Wodak (1999) were combined, including authorisation, moralisation, narrativisation, normalisation, 
rationalisation, and, similar to previous studies (Green & Li, 2011; Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012; Hyndman 
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& Liguori, 2016) pathos (taking into consideration emerging references to the role of such elements 
as personal commitment, career dedication, etc.). As discussed in the literature review, such strategies 
are not to be considered mutually exclusive and are, indeed, likely to be used in combination.  
Each strategy was identified through a number of elements (or sub-strategies) that represented a cue 
for the more general one (Appendix 1 shows examples of coding and quotations, reporting the 
strategies that were used in each example). Following Hyndman and Liguori (2016), legitimation 
strategies were coded with a final “1‟, whereas delegitimation strategies were coded with a final “2‟. 
A similar framework was originally developed for use in discourse analysis, and has been applied in 
previous research (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012). Table 2 shows the relative use and occurrence of each 
family of strategies in the two decades, while Table 3 provides the details of the sub-
strategies/elements that composed the most common strategies (namely authorisation and 
moralisation) in Italy. The unit of analysis of the transcripts was the paragraph, which represents “a 
collection of meaningful sentences” (Guthrie, Johanson, Bukh & Sànchez, 2003, p.10). For the analysis 
of the relative occurrence of each legitimation strategy, a repetition of the same argument (belonging 
to a certain strategy) within the same paragraph was only counted once. More strategies, however, 
could be present and used in relation to the same topic or change to strengthen or clarify an argument. 
Although this paper does not focus on the specific strategies’ co-occurrences, combinations of at least 
two strategies represented 29% of the total hits in the 1990s and 47% in the 2000sData coding and 
analysis were supported by the software ATLAS.ti 6. The transcripts were read by the coders in detail 
and it was left to the coders’ interpretation whether a certain paragraph was used to cue a particular 
reform area or legitimation strategy. All cases of disagreement were reviewed and resolved.  
As any research approach, also this type of analysis presents limitations. Textual analyses generally 
require demonstrating the reliability of the tools used to collect and code the data, as well as the 
consequent validity and replicability of inferences drawn from them (Milne & Adler 1999). Reliability 
involves stability (ability to code data similarly over time), reproducibility (when multiple coders are 
involved) and accuracy (quality of coding against previous studies, Krippendorff, 1980). In order to 
ensure reliability, well-specified coding rules were defined in advance, multiple coders were used and 
discrepancies between them were re-examined until an agreement was reached. 
 
4. Public-sector accounting reforms and the deployment of legitimation strategies by MPs 
 
4.1 The 1990s: NPM “all’italiana”4 
In Italy, central-government financial accounting, budgeting and performance reporting have always 
been traditionally cash- and commitment-based, crafted to ensure budgetary compliance and control 
over expenditures. During the 1990s, increasing attention was paid to the new managerial principles 
that were being proposed under the banner of NPM. This was reflected in the adoption of the law 
94/1997, aiming, among other provisions, at defining clearer managerial responsibilities, as well as at 
introducing accruals accounting and reporting, and cost accounting tools. The budget structure was 
simplified and aggregated to increase managerial autonomy and responsibilities. Cost and 
responsibility centres were identified in each ministry and cost-accounting items were related to 
efficiency and effectiveness indicators. The new cost-accounting and the old cash- and commitment-
accounting systems were designed to be integrated, with the former aimed at keeping track of 
expenses per cost and responsibility centre, and the latter at managing the budget cycle, from the 
budget approval to its implementation and reporting. The 1990s in Italy witnessed, like most Western 
countries, a raise in the discussions about the introduction of new managerial accounting tools. But 
how were these changes talked about and justified by politicians?  
Looking at the language and legitimation strategies used, there is a clear evolution inthe arguments 
used over time (see Table 2 for the relative use and occurrence of each family of strategies in absolute 
and percentage terms). In the 1990s, the main strategy deployed by the MPs during their debates on 
accounting reforms was authorisation: 50% of all strategies identified referred to authority sources to 
justify and explain (rather than delegitimate, AUT1 vs AUT2) the changes. These were mainly used 
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with reference to national and institutional actors, such as Parliament (and its Chambers) and political 
parties (32% of the times AUT1 was used, see Table 3, which provides examples of the main sub-
strategies used in absolute and percentage terms in the two decades), followed by mentions to 
Government and (other) laws. For instance, in relation to the former two, in the discussions on the 
1997 accruals-accounting bill (subsequently Law 94/1997): 
“Bruno Solaroli, chair, expresses his appreciation for the in-depth analysis of the Senate on the 2732 
Bill and for the accurate job of the speaker and, in consideration of the importance of the matter, he 
hopes the Bill’s content may be agreed on by the different political groups” (Committee discussion, 
Chamber of Deputies, 04/12/1996)    
 
And also, with reference to the introduction of accruals accounting (and related changes) as 
potentially useful to Parliament and other government departments: 
“It would be appropriate for the Treasury to implement an accounting information flow that may 
guarantee autonomous access of this information to Parliament” (Deputy Antonio Boccia, Committee 
discussion, Chamber of Deputies, 04/12/1996) 
 
The second most used strategy was moralisation (24% of the total strategies used, Table 2), with 
particular reference to the importance of both internal and external transparency and accountability: 
“The problem of Treasury cash flows should be dealt with at the root, defining mechanisms to link 
budgeting and cash-flow management. Without this, cash management will continue to be a cause for 
the poor administration of public finances and this goes against the interest of the Government and 
the leading parties themselves” (Deputy Pietro Armani, Committee discussion, Chamber of Deputies, 
06/02/1997).    
 
Among the moralisation arguments, MPs also stressed the importance of transparent policies to 
guarantee a fair treatment for the South of Italy, economically less developed (Table 3). Financial 
accounting, budgeting and performance management policies were seen as an internal, national 
matter, aimed at tackling equality and development issues. The assumption was that appropriate 
decisions would be taken by the competent authorities, respecting what was in the public interest: 
“Salvatore Cherchi posits that the budget must make evident the interventions in favour of the poorest 
areas of the country” (Committee discussion, Chamber of Deputies’, 04/121996) 
 
In this reform context, strongly led by legalistic and moral principles, it is perhaps not surprising that 
legitimation based on rational arguments (RAT1), such as better decision making and the importance 
of education, skills and resources to manage the State, was only the third most used (17% of the times, 
Table 2). In the relatively few cases where rational arguments were made, these were usually 
accompanied by strong authorisation references (such as mentions to the parliamentary Chambers) 
and, often, referred to very broad management improvements: 
“As far as the new definition of basic budgetary units is concerned, he [Salvatore Cherchi] considers 
positively the balance reached by the Senate when formulating the provision which allows to re-
aggregate expenditure by homogeneous areas and to valorise the role of senior managers in our public 
administration, who should be directly made accountable if we want to achieve the indicated 
objectives” (Committee discussion, Chamber of Deputies, 06/02/1997).    
 
The other legitimation strategies identified by this study (narrativisation, normalisation, and pathos) 
were used only marginally, representing 2% or 1% of the total (Table 2). Also delegitimation strategies 
overall only accounted for 6% of the total, and manly as a critique to the Government of the time 
(AUT2): MPs mainly spoke of accounting changes in positive terms, explaining and pushing their 
arguments, rather than delegitimating and criticising either the current reform or different and 
previous ones. This may be due to their relative lack of technical knowledge on the matter. As 
indicated in the methodology section, the majority of the MPs discussing accounting reforms were, 
when considered together, lawyers or social scientists, although, in the case of the 1997 reform, 23% 
of the MPs responsible for discussing the reforms (as chosen by the respective parties) also showed 
some kind of previous knowledge of accounting. It was thus expert talk, but carried out mostly by non-
experts. Consistently, while general arguments referring to the importance of regulations, 
government and political steering were often made, together with statements on the importance of 
transparency and accountability (see the strong use of MOR1 arguments made, Table 2), much less 
common were mentions to rationalisation and normalisation arguments (Table 2), which would, 
instead, indicate a technical and professional understanding of the accounting issues at stake. MPs 
were more likely to justify their claims by stressing the necessity of accounting reform in an old-style, 
bureaucratic fashion (Hyndman et al., 2014), i.e. by referencing previous regulation, formal 
procedures and hierarchical forms of authority.   
Finally, different political parties appeared to support their policy propositions in very similar ways. 
Indeed, no clear differences were visible in the ranking of the main legitimation strategies used by 
MPs belonging to different parties (including government majority vs. opposition of the period). For 
instance, in the 1990s both the left-wing government and the opposition parties mainly used AUT1 
strategies (53% and 48% respectively, data not shown in tables), followed by MOR 1 (26% and 14%) 
and RAT1 (17% and 14% respectively). This suggests that the underlying political ideology may have 
not strongly influenced the rhetoric adopted by politicians to advance accounting reforms, perhaps as 
a consequence of their technical nature. Indeed, discussions around technical aspects and practices 
may raise less controversy and produce more alignment than other types of reforms. This finding may 
also be influenced by the managerialisation of the public sector, which took place also in Italy in the 
1990s. As managerial ideas have been often publicised as progressive and positive (OECD, 1997), this 
may have made their definitive criticisms or dismissal by any of the political parties less likely.  
 
4.2 The 2000s: the euro, crisis and austerity 
After a few years of experimentation with the 1997 reform, the 2000s mark the appearance in the 
political discussion of two important events: the introduction of the euro as common currency (in 
2000) and, later, the beginning of the financial and fiscal crisis (in 2008). Both clearly appear to have 
left a mark in the debate and effects on the accounting systems and policies subsequently adopted. 
The first accounting reform of this decade was in 2009, with the law 196/2009 on the new central-
government accounting and financial rules. This law was aimed at ensuring the so-called 
“harmonization” of accounting systems across the Italian public sector, through the definition of a 
unified chart of accounts, the confirmation of an integrated system of cash-, commitment- and 
accruals-based accounting, and the refinement of accounting and bookkeeping standards and rules 
through a period of experimentation. Also, it reintroduced and strengthened the role of cash-based 
information in both government budgeting and accounts. Subsequently, as the global financial crisis 
unfolded, in 2011 a law was approved to address the new provisions necessary to coordinate 
economic and accounting policies in the light of the membership in the European Union (EU). Hence, 
the 2009 law was further revised (with the law 39/2011) to align Italy with the new EU regulation. A 
European directive, in particular, aimed at tackling some of the weaknesses the States’ financial 
systems had shown after the 2008 crisis. This included tighter controls on macroeconomic equilibria 
and greater transparency and accountability towards the EU. Moreover, as the Fiscal Compact5 was 
adopted by a number of EU countries, in 2012 Italy made compulsory (through the law 243/2012) the 
principle of balanced budget by implementing a Constitutional amendment concerning the definition 
of balanced budget and the allowed public debt. According to the new principles, all public 
administrations have to ensure the achievement of the equilibrium between revenues and 
expenditures and sustainable levels of debt, in accordance with European regulations. 
Looking at how these developments were reflected in the parliamentary debates, it is worth noting 
that, in the 2000s, discussions were mainly focused on budgeting issues and, especially, on the 
importance of financial equilibria at a country level, clearly also as a consequence of the recent 
financial crisis:  
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and Monetary Union. 
“Lino Duilio remarks how the attempt is to strengthen the binding value and efficacy of the new rules 
through more rigorous procedures and timely mechanisms, also using sanctions to decrease political 
discretion. […] He believes that the 1997 Growth and Stability Pact reform did not prevent a number 
of countries in the European Economic Union from being unequipped for the recent crisis, due to 
deficits and public-debts values much higher than the Maastricht’s parameters” (Committee 
discussion, Chamber of Deputies, 21/02/2012) 
 
In this decade, the main strategy used by the MPs was again authorisation (although at a lower base, 
40% of the total, Table 2). A more detailed look, however, suggests that things changed much more 
than the numbers would hint at. Investigating the specific arguments and sub-strategies the MPs used 
to justify and explain the need of changes in the accounting systems, in this decade the main points 
of reference were no longer Italian Parliament and political issues, but the EU, the Eurozone and the 
related requirements. 36% of the times (vs. 3% in the 1990s) an authorisation strategy was used, this 
made reference to European matters and how to deal with them (this often followed by references to 
law and regulation, Table 3). For instance: 
“Senator Morando expresses, on behalf of his group, his strong disapproval of the item in agenda, as 
the necessity to modify the article 81 of the Constitution does not only stem from a requirement of the 
European Union, but also from the necessity to modernise the rules concerning public-sector financial 
management and expenditure; this has been already attempted multiple times during a number of 
reform processes of public-sector accounting laws” (Committee discussion, Senate, 07/12/2012) 
 
And also: 
“Lino Duilio remarks that although the reform today is discussed by this Committee, it has a clear 
European blueprint and represents the output of the recent European economic and financial 
integration process. [...] Since then [the integration], the national accounting legislation has become 
progressively more complex, as a consequence of the concurrent application of European regulations” 
(Committee discussion, Chamber of Deputies, 21/02/2012)     
 
In this second period, the EU became the main source of reference in accounting matters, followed by 
the Italian Parliament, and regulations (each with 14% of mentions, Table 3). Also references to the 
financial crisis and to market pressures became more evident (while absent in the 1990s discussions), 
representing 3% and 2% of the total arguments respectively.  
The second source of legitimation was, once again, moralisation, and, also in this case, with nuances 
different from the 1990s. While ideas concerning economic development and support of the South of 
Italy disappeared from the discussion, other arguments were brought in, such as broad environmental 
and inter-generational sustainability issues (6% of the moralisation strategies used, Table 3) and the 
necessity of “good administration” (1%, Table 3). Transparency and accountability towards citizens 
remained the main arguments made in relation to financial accounting, budgeting and performance 
management changes.  
The other legitimation strategies, especially RAT1, showed a stable pattern over the two decades, the 
only interesting note being the relative presence (1% of the arguments overall) of pathos now 
deployed to justify reforms. Contrary to what suggested by previous studies (Hyndman & Liguori, 
2016), this was not used by the Italian politicians to stress their role as “champions of change”, but 
rather to emphasise a personal belief in the necessity of fairness towards the citizens, especially in the 
light of the cuts and taxes that had to be posed to cope with the financial crisis: 
“He [Matteo Bragantini] notes that since great sacrifices are going to be asked from the citizens, 
touching both taxes and pensions, it is unthinkable not to revise the salary thresholds for the managers 
working in companies that are owned by the State.” (Committee discussion, Chamber of Deputies, 
21/02/2012)     
 
Similar to the 1990s, also in the 2000s accounting reforms were mainly spoken about and justified in 
positive terms, with delegitimation fairly marginal (only 11% overall, Table 2). Interestingly, 
delegitimation through authorisation was the relatively more frequent one (5% of the total strategies 
used) and this was also mainly based (37% of the times AUT2 was identifiable– detail not shown in the 
tables) on criticisms to the role and rules of the EU: 
“Senator Massimo Garavaglia announces his group’s vote to be in favour of the proposal number 5.6 
and stresses his criticism of the content of the Bill no. 3047 [on the Constitutional changes to the 
budget balancing rules] due to the absolutely wrong choice to legislate under the dictatorship of both 
the European Institutions and the financial ‘spread’” (Committee discussion, Senate, 12/07/2012) 
 
Insert Table 2 and 3  
 
The limited role played by delegitimation strategies and the scant difference between opposition and 
majority parties also in the 2000s (where the main strategies used by the government were 40% 
AUT1– vs 42% of the opposition– and 26% MOR1– vs. 25% of the opposition; with RAT1 representing 
18% of the strategies used for both groups) offer additional support to the considerations on the 
nature of accounting reforms. The topics discussed and the changes proposed (i.e., technical 
accounting issues) may reduce the scope of antagonistic debate. Further research is needed in this 
respect, especially to explore the type of strategies used to (de)legitimate different areas of public-
sector reforms.  
 
5. MPs and the legitimation of accounting reforms: insights from politicians’ talk 
While previous studies, in both the private and the public sectors, explored managers’ understanding 
and legitimation of change, this paper adopts a new perspective by focusing on politicians, who may 
potentially use different rhetorical arguments to justify accounting changes. Moreover, while previous 
public-sector studies on the theme mainly investigated change processes ex-post (Liguori & Steccolini, 
2012; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016), this research offers an overview of how politicians brought forward 
accounting reforms at the time they were being discussed. The analysis of the Italian MPs’ debates 
over the 1990s and 2000s offers insights on the way politicians justify technical reforms and policies. 
It is worth stressing that, although it was an expert talk, only few of the MPs discussing reforms were 
actually knowledgeable of accounting matters. As the expert talk moves to non-experts, the role of 
language and of the arguments put forward to substantiate a new policy assumes different meanings. 
MPs did not speak as practitioners to an audience of peers, but appealed to broader and less technical 
topics to convince the Parliamentary audience of the appropriateness of accounting reforms. In 
Bourdieu’s (1991) terms, language shaped a different type of “symbolic power”, exerted not on the 
basis of technical knowledge, but of rhetorical skills. Consistently, the analysis shows that 
normalisation and professional arguments were among the least used overall, but, maybe surprisingly, 
also rational arguments did not directly come to the fore. Authorisation and moralisation strategies 
were the most recurrent, although, as discussed, with different nuances over the two periods and 
across the different sets of reforms. The changes in the type of arguments between the two periods 
coincides with two important events in Europe (and Italy): the introduction of the European common 
currency (chosen, for analysis purposes, as the cut-off point between periods) and the financial crisis. 
In the 2000s the EU is at the centre of the MPs’ arguments in both positive and negative terms: it is 
now seen, indeed, as the main authority (even more than Government and Parliament) pushing 
accounting changes; it is also the one to blame when these changes seem to be too onerous or difficult 
to implement.  
This perceived loss of power from the Italian Parliament in favour of the EU is counteracted by the 
MPs through the power of language, as politicians invoke or blame a higher authority to justify their 
own actions. Responsibility and accountability are, thus, relinquished by the very institution that 
should represent the citizens’ interests. This finding is different from those of previous public-sector 
studies on central-government manager’s discourses (Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). While for managers, 
the main sources of authority seemed to be embodied by Parliament and Government (Hyndman & 
Liguori, 2016), this study suggests that in countries which are part of larger political and/or economic 
unions, such as the EU, the Parliament does not identify itself as the main source of regulation and 
steering anymore, but rather sees itself as a medium between a higher authority (the EU) and the 
country. The way in which politicians discuss public-sector accounting reforms in the new Millennium 
reflects an implicit acceptance that the EU gradually came to control the member-States’ public 
finances, becoming an active part in their budgeting processes, and influencing the very concept of 
balanced budget, even determining its inclusion into the Constitution. More generally, Italian 
politicians considered referencing European issues and requirements not only an acceptable, but also 
a reasonably viable strategy in their decision-making process. Implicitly acknowledging the surrender 
of its decision-making powers, the Parliament‘s attempt is thus to preserve at least some autonomy, 
rather than to create new, effective, accounting policies. 
Interestingly, the Italian MPs who spoke paid great attention to moralisation arguments, especially in 
terms of transparency and accountability. This may be consistent with politicians’ rhetorical tendency 
to put public interest and good governance first, whether or not reforms are actually directed in that 
sense. A number of authors, indeed, have questioned government austerity strategies and whether 
these actually are in the public interest (Lodge & Hood, 2012; Murray, Erridge & Rimmer, 2012; Bracci 
et al., 2016). The role moralisation arguments play in the Italian Parliament seems surprisingly 
consistent with previous private-sector findings, which specifically investigated how different actors 
justify change as a consequence of scandals in accounting firms and industrial restructuring (Covaleski 
et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2006). Similar studies in the UK central government, however, have shown 
that arguments based on moralisation seldom accompany public-sector accounting reforms 
(Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). This different finding in Italy may be due to the political emphasis often 
put on the achievement of public interest, even more so because the discussions analysed in this paper 
were political, rather than managerial, like in Hyndman and Liguori’s (2016) paper. Politicians may 
tend to present their actions as instrumental to the achievement of the “common good”, while 
managers are more likely to identify and discuss the managerial and organisational factors that affect 
and justify the accounting changes (from a more technical point of view). A parallel between managers 
and politicians is, instead, visible as far as the use of language to “purify” and make changes acceptable 
is concerned (Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007 and 2015). Similar to what suggested for managers at 
the organisational level (Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007 and 2015), politicians “purify” the language 
in a way that can be understood and is usable by both themselves and their parliamentary peers.  
As highlighted in the results, the technical nature of the issues being discussed is also likely to have 
affected politicians’ views and arguments. Our study, indeed, did not find visible differences between 
opposition and majority parties. This could have a twofold explanation: on the one hand, calculative 
and more technical practices may generate less rhetorical and discursive controversy than other types 
of reforms (such as those on healthcare and environmental issues); on the other hand, the strong 
wave of NPM reforms and managerialisation of the public sector of the last few decades has made the 
new systems and practices (including accounting) increasingly taken for granted (Hyndman & Liguori, 
2016). It may be more difficult, as a consequence, for politicians (irrespective of their political party 
and creed) to delegitimate and defy openly such reforms, when these have been largely depicted by 
media and professionals as progressive and socially desirable. This argument is consistent with the 
scant presence of delegitimation strategies found in the study.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This study aimed at exploring the use of language and legitimation strategies by MPs as they discuss 
and approve public-sector accounting reforms. It provides evidence of the language and legitimation 
strategies deployed by politicians to influence parliamentary debates on public-sector reforms, 
showing how these evolved from a managerial era into one dominated by the Eurozone crisis and 
austerity. The results suggest that, during the 1990s, Italian MPs were mostly focused on domestic 
issues when debating and justifying the adoption of public-sector accounting reforms; their arguments 
ranging from references to authorities in the Italian political arena (political parties, Parliament, laws), 
to the need to ensure fairness across different Italian geographic areas, to the long-lasting problem of 
waste of public resources. This mirrors a view of accounting as a reflection of the State’s sovereign 
power, and of accounting reforms as a matter of domestic affairs to either manage public-sector 
organisations or keep public finances under control. Reforms had, therefore, to be advanced by 
ensuring balance and agreement across different interests and powers within the State (including 
different geographical areas, such as the less- economically developed South of Italy). Accounting 
reforms were justified on grounds related to internal matters or the need to improve the management 
of resources. However, the parliamentary discussions in the 2000s reflect a fundamental shift in what 
was considered relevant for legitimating accounting reforms. The adoption of the euro, the emergence 
of the so-called Eurozone (and the related institutions, such as the European Central Bank), the 
increasing importance taken on by the Growth and Stability Pact and the necessity to cut resources to 
respect the debt limits, all pointed to an increased role of the EU and its policies also in domestic 
issues. This situation was further exacerbated by the outburst of the global financial crisis and the 
ensuing fiscal and sovereign-debt crises. The analysis suggests that public-sector accounting reforms 
were not immune from these “processes”, but, rather, were a clear example of increasing influence 
of the EU on the countries’ political decision-making processes. 
After 2000, public-sector accounting does not represent a domestic issue any longer, but becomes 
intertwined with Italy’s very membership in the EU and the Eurozone. As a consequence, reforms were 
not presented by MPs as a way to improve the internal management of the State, but as a tool for 
ensuring harmonisation, comparison and consolidation of economic and financial data. Our study 
suggests that the turn of the Millennium and the emergence of the Eurozone, as well as the global 
financial crisis, allowed MPs to legitimate public-sector accounting reforms shifting dramatically from 
an internal focus to an international, European-based, one. From an accounting perspective, this 
seems to reflect changes in the very meaning of public-sector accounting in Europe.  
From a theoretical point of view, following Bourdieu (1991), we claim that certain rhetorical devices 
can provide legitimation of authority and confer credibility to those who engage with change and 
reforms showing “power over language”. This study helps define such devices (in the form of 
legitimation strategies) in more detail, and, in the case of political discourses, highlights how the use 
of language can facilitate the exercise of power, even when the speakers (MPs) do not directly 
participate in expert talk, but are able to deploy arguments that are rhetorically dominated by “more 
generalist and political” authorisation and moralisation strategies. The rhetorical arguments brought 
forward allow MPs, and politicians more in general, to disguise their actual loss of power in favour of 
the EU, depicting their actions and proposals as necessary and/or in favour of the public interest (as 
reflected by the large use of moralisation arguments made). The analysis of the symbolic power of 
language unveils a critical path that has been undertaken, one where politicians, Governments and 
Parliaments no longer need to answer to their electors, but abdicate their responsibility and 
accountability duties to external, often not directly represented, authorities. A possible lesson to be 
kept in mind in the aftermath of Brexit.  
This paper also contributes to existing literature by investigating more closely the relationship 
between codified discourses and practice (Llewellyn & Milne, 2007; Liguori et al, 2016). Different from 
previous literature on the theme (Covaleski et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2006; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016), 
it does not explore the managers’ perspective, but the development of politicians’ arguments over 
time. The political talk has been often seen as a language of legitimation; this study proposes some 
caveats and identifies possible critical issues in the use of the symbolic power of language during 
parliamentary reforms (Bourdieu, 1991; Abulof, 2015). These issues, in particular, could ultimately 
threaten the credibility and accountability of our political decision makers and parliamentary 
democracies.  
It is worth reminding that these results refer to a neo-Weberian, civil-law country, where public-sector 
change is generally ignited by the adoption and implementation of law, and where NPM has been only 
mildly adopted (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011; Liguori, Steccolini & Rota, 2016; Arnaboldi et al., 2016). 
Further studies may be conducted in the future in other countries within and outside the EU, and with 
different administrative traditions, to identify possible patterns in the use of political language. The 
study could also be extended to the European Parliament itself, or by looking at other types of reforms, 
including private-sector accounting ones, investigating whether different reforms are rhetorically 
legitimated in different ways. Finally, a further way forward may be looking at the influence of MPs’-
political beliefs, backgrounds and, more generally, personal traits, on the legitimation strategies they 
adopt6.  
  
                                                            
6 We thank one of the referees for identifying this further research avenue.  
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Table 1 - Educational background of politicians who took the floor in accounting-reform debates 
  1990s 2000s 
Educational background/area Number of politicians Percentage Number of politicians Percentage 
Law 10 32% 17 25% 
Accounting/economics/business administration 7 23% 17 25% 
Political sciences/sociology 5 16% 8 12% 
School diploma 3 10% 9 13% 
Other degrees 6 19% 18 26% 
Total 31 100% 69 100% 
 
Table 2 – Legitimation strategies and politicians: a time comparison 
 1990s 
AUT1 AUT2 MOR1 MOR2 NAR1 NAR2 NOR1 NOR2 PAT1 PAT2 RAT1 RAT2 Total 
Strategy 
counts 
50 4 24 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 17 1 100 
Percentage 50% 4% 24% 0% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 17% 1% 100% 
 2000s 
AUT1 AUT2 MOR1 MOR2 NAR1 NAR2 NOR1 NOR2 PAT1 PAT2 RAT1 RAT2 Total  
Strategy 
counts 469 54 311 19 39 9 17 9 10 3 196 25 1161 
Percentage 40% 5% 27% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 17% 2% 100% 














European Union1 2 3% 
Good governance/ 
transparency for citizens1 22 92% 
Finance Department1  3 4% 
Development of the South of 
Italy1 2 8% 
Government1 13 18%     
Internal management1 3 4%     
Law and regulation1 12 16%     
Mimetic pressures1 3 4%     
Political pressures1 24 32%     
Fiscal requirements1 1 1%     
Stakeholders’ pressures1 8 11%     
Vice ministers1 5 7%     














Crisis1 23 3% Good administration1 6 1.5% 
European Union1 307 36% Gender equality/budgeting1 1 0.5% 
Finance Department1  13 2% 
Good governance/ 
transparency for citizens1 344 92% 
Government1 59 7% 
Social and environmental 
sustainability1 24 6% 
Internal management1 1 0%    
International organisations1 1 0%     
Law and regulation1 120 14%     
Market pressures1 21 2%     
Mimetic pressures1 33 4%     
Other sources of authority1 14 2%     
Political pressures1 117 14%     
Fiscal requirements1 44 5%     
Vice ministers1 41 5%     
Stakeholders’ pressures1 55 6%     




Coding scheme and examples of quotations 
Possible Legitimation Strategies Examples of quotations/coding and legitimation strategies (1- positive, 2- negative) 
Authorisation 
(political or mimetic pressures, financial 
crisis, fiscal requirements, stakeholders, 
market pressures, EU, Government, law 
and regulation, etc.) 
Moralisation  
(transparency, gender equality, social 
and environmental sustainability, good 
administration, ethics, etc.) 
Narrativisation  
(reference to stories or history, 
scandals or exemplars of behaviour, 
etc.) 
Normalisation 
(professional norms and bodies, public 
vs. private sector, etc.) 
Pathos 
(personal commitment, dedication, 
patriotism, etc.) 
Rationalisation 
(managerial reforms, culture, effective 
planning and decision making, skills and 
education, resources, IT, etc.) 
 
“Giorgio Macciotta expresses his appreciation for the generous explanation given and stresses the Government’s availability to 
improve the content of the Bill. He reminds that accounting and budgeting rules had been traditionally designed by the Parliament 
with the help of all political forces: also the text of the current Bill is the result of a unanimous agreement within the Budget 
Committee of the Senate, subsequently ratified by the Chamber of Deputies” (Chamber of Deputies, 28th November 1996) 
Legitimation strategy(ies): AUT1  
 
“Antonio Marzano asks the Government to clarify why in the budget package now under the Parliament’s scrutiny, the allocations 
in favour of ISCO [Institute for the Study of Economic Conditions] and ISPE [Institute for the Study of Economic Planning] have 
increased, although these are in the process of merging. This reorganisation should have rationalised the Institutes’ activities, and 
should also aim at decreasing their fixed operational costs and public transfers” (Chamber of Deputies, 4th December 1996) 
(delegitimation) 
Legitimation strategy(ies): AUT1, RAT1, RAT2, 
 
“Giuseppe Calderisi thinks the principle of ‘balanced budget’ should be introduced into the Constitutional Chart not only because 
the European Union requires Italy to guarantee the sustainability of its debt, but also because it is a just and necessary principle. 
It is important to be aware that the constitutional adoption of this principle does not represent a mere change in the accounting 
regulation, but it involves changing our idea of the concepts of democracy and State, because we are changing the fiscal 
constitution through which we define the economic and financial activities of all public entities…” (Chamber of Deputies, 24th 
October 2011 ) 
Legitimation strategy(ies): AUT1, NOR1, MOR1 
 
“Enrico La Loggia: ‘I think that neither Minghetti in 1876 or Einaudi and Vanoni7 in 1946 would have ever imagined what is 
happening in this venue today. I simply refer to the fact that when a country, and in this case an authoritative Parliament, decides 
to introduce such an important principle in the Constitution, this has to be done because they are convinced, because it is deemed 
useful, necessary, not surely because someone else thinks it should be done, even more if this someone is outside our national 
borders. I refer to this prevailing necessity to conform, so the it becomes almost irreversible that Europe should be governed by 
technocrats or bureaucrats from Brussels and Strasburg, without the real participation of the member States…’” (Chamber of 
Deputies, 19th July 2012) (delegitimation) 
Legitimation strategy(ies): AUT1, AUT2, PAT1, RAT2 
                                                            
7 Marco Minghetti was a right-wing Italian politicians under whose government Italy reached, for the first time, a balanced budget. Luigi Einaudi was the second president of the Italian Republic 
(1948-1955) and Ezio Vanoni was the minister of Finance (1954-1956). 
 
“Senator Mercatali observes that the text which arrived at the attention of the Chamber is of quality […] It is important to grasp 
this chance to put all public accounts in order, following rules agreed by all political parties, but especially following principles that 
are understandable and shared by the citizens. As far as the reduction of the debt is concerned, considering the importance of the 
problem, it would be damaging and politically difficult to go down a path that is not understood by all citizens, who will ultimately 
suffer its effects.” (Senate, 23rd February 2011) 
Legitimation strategy(ies): AUT1, MOR1 
 
“After having recalled the work done by the Committee in the previous and current legislatures, through an in-depth activity of 
analysis, he [Roberto Di Rosa] notices that over time different possible solutions have been explored, from an experimental budget 
to the budget by cost centres, from the budget by functional objectives to the budget by responsibility centres…” (Chamber of 
Deputies, 28th November 1996) 
Legitimation strategy(ies): AUT1, NAR1, RAT1 
 
  
 
 
  
 
